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 1. Introduction 
The important decentralization process carried out in Spain during the last 
decades has lead to become Autonomous Communities (ACs) in the most significant 
public expenditure managers. At the same time, regional governments are responsible 
of the highest volume of productive investment. However, the relative weakness of the 
traditional financial sources to cover investments (current saving, capital grants and 
borrowing) has queried ACs’ investment ability. So an alternative set of financial 
mechanisms has been developed, in order to maintain a high public investment level. 
All those mechanisms would be compatible with the debt restrictions imposed by 
European and Spanish regulation (Stability and Growth Pact and Budgetary Stability 
Act). This paper focuses in the public sector enterprises (PSEs), which could be using 
as a way to avoid those budget constraints. 
There is no a unique concept or a single definition that could characterize 
accurately PSEs. In USA, it is normally used the term ‘public authority’ to refer to a 
quasi-governmental agency created for a specific public sector purpose (Eger, 2006). 
Selected European national denominations of PSEs include Etablissements Publics 
(France), Crown Agencies / Non-Departmental Public Bodies (UK), Eigenbetriebe 
(Germany), Aziende con Personalita Giuridica Pubblica / Enti pubblici non economici 
(Italy), Stadtwerke (Austria) or Intercomunale (Belgium). In Spain there are also many 
kinds of public entities like Empresas Públicas, Entes Públicos, Entidades Públicas 
Empresariales, Consorcios and other institutions. In this paper, we do not care about 
the legal status of the public sector entities. In fact, we focused on two relevant issues of 
PSEs from an economic perspective: (1) their classification either inside or outside of 
the general government sector and (2) the connexion between aggregate efficiency and 
PSEs.  
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 The aim of this paper consists on analyzing the creation of regional public firms 
in order to elude the legal restrictions on public deficit and debt. This is one of the main 
mechanisms to get credits, collaborating with the private sector and at the same time, 
guarantying the Budgetary Stability Act’s compliance. However, as far as not all the 
public firms would have been created to get such an objective, we will try to capture the 
‘efficiency’ or ‘value for money’ effect linked to institutional and organizational 
changes in the provision of public services. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we appraise the 
analytical background of ACs’ financing choices concerning the relative costs of any 
alternative. In section 3 we discuss about the role and delimitation of PSEs and the 
measuring of the efficiency in the Public Sector (including PSEs). Also, a brief 
statistical panorama of the recent evolution of PSEs in ACs is also presented here. 
Section 4 includes a literature revision which summarizes the main results of previous 
empiric papers, in particular for the USA. In section 5 we present an empirical model 
based on a panel data approach for the 17 ACs in 1994-2008 period. Finally, we draw 
the main conclusions from our analysis. 
 
2. A brief view about the regional financial system in Spain 
2.1. The weakness of ACs’ traditional revenue sources  
During the last 30 years, Spanish Autonomous Communities (regional 
governments) have increased their expenditures and competences. In fact, they have 
become in the main public expenditure agent in Spain. Their expenditures exceed the 
aggregate expenditures by Central Government, Social Security and Local 
Governments. According to IGAE (2009), in 2008 ACs managed the 36,3% of public 
3
 sector non-financial expenditures, while Social Security handled the 28,8%, Central 
Government the 21,6% and Local Governments the 13,2% of total public expenditures.  
Additionally, ACs are the government level showing the highest investment 
expenditure, especially from 2000 onward. Graph 1 shows an increasing trend of all 
government levels’ gross fixed capital formation during the period 1995-2008 for 
different levels of government (Central, ACs, Local Goverments). That trend is more 
emphasized in the case of ACs. Thus, ACs have a significant roll promoting as capital 
stock and economic growth in Spain.   
 
Graph 1:  Public Sector Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% GDP) 
(P) Provisional. (A) Advance. Source: IGAE and National Statistics Institute. 
 
However, public revenues in Spain have not been shared in a similar way as 
expenditures. In this respect, notice that there is significant fiscal disequilibrium. IGAE 
(2009) data show that ACs only managed the 22.7% of total non-financial revenues, 
which means a negative lag of 13.6 percentage points, compared with their participation 
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 in public expenditures. Follow, we analyze the three ‘traditional’ sources (current 
savings, grants and borrowing) of the ACs in order to finance their outlays. 
 
Current saving 
It has grown-up quickly during the last decade, due to a dynamic economic 
growth and a quick increase in tax revenues. Although the main taxes (income tax and 
corporate tax) were reformed towards a nominal reduction in tax rates, public revenues 
increasing was based on the economic growth experimented during that period. Some 
economic factors, such as profits, labour income and households’ consumption 
increased strongly. However, national and international economic situation has 
deteriorated in the last recent years, so fiscal revenues have reduced significantly, even 
with the announced tax rates increasing (mainly in VAT). Additionally, the main taxes 
are handled by central government and ACs have strong constrains to create their own 
tributes. All of these factors condition the current revenues’ growth of ACs.  
On the other hand, many current expenditures in ACs are very difficult or costly 
to reduce in the short run, so it reduces their margin of manoeuvre (Barberán-Ortí, 
2005). In particular, it is really complicated to reduce some budgetary items such as 
labour expenditures, transfers or debt burden1. Additionally, there are new factors 
which have influence on current expenditures, such as some demographic issues 
(population growth and ageing, especially significant in health services) and new social 
services (introduced by the Spanish Law 39/2006). As a consequence, current savings 
improvements can only be obtained from three sources: 
                                                          
1 It may be possible to reduce that item by means of a debt renegotiation with financial institutions. 
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 a) Public expenditure reduction. For the reasons previously mentioned, capital 
expenditures will probably suffer such a cut, leading to deteriorate more the 
potential economic growth.  
b) Tax rates increases. They are limited to income tax, tax on inheritances and 
gifts, some indirect taxes (electricity, matriculation of vehicles and retail fuel 
tax) and small environmental taxes. ACs have no regulatory capacity neither on 
VAT and selective consumption taxes (tobacco, alcohol and gasoline) nor 
corporate tax. This is a not probable way to solve the revenue deficit, due to the 
political and economic costs of implementing it during economic crisis period.   
c) Efficiency/productivity improvements. To achieve that aim, it would be 
necessary to reinforce internal control and external auditing, and to introduce 
new management techniques, trying to improve global efficiency. The main 
disadvantage is that potential savings are observed only in the long run.  
 
Grants 
European funds for Spain were reduced for the 2007-2013 period. From 2013 
they will be significantly reduced again because Spain got an income level up to 100% 
of EU27 GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity). The Spanish Constitution 
requires a national fund (the Interterritorial Compensation Fund) whose aim is to offset 
economic imbalances across regions. However this national fund will not be able to 
replace the European funds, al least in the short term due to budget general restrictions.  
 
Borrowing 
Borrowing is the ‘locking mechanism’ in the budget and it is also an adequate 
instrument for intergenerational equity (Musgrave, 1959). The Spanish budgetary 
6
 stability legislation in 2001 imposed the annual budget balance and it also restricts 
borrowing to exceptional events. This was a major constraint to investment finance and 
it imposed a pro-cyclical fiscal policy, as Vallés-Giménez (2002) pointed out2. 
 
The alternatives 
Given this general panorama, ACs wish to maintain their investment projects 
avoiding an inefficient and costly tax increasing. In fact, they might have several 
alternatives for action but all of them depend on the general government reform and 
require a broad political consensus. The first one is the change in the regional financing 
system in order to reduce the vertical fiscal imbalance, encouraging fiscal responsibility 
and facilitating the growth of current savings. This reform is being negotiated right now 
between the ACs and the Government of Spain. 
The second alternative would be a substantial increase in the Interterritorial 
Compensation Fund, in the line suggested by Fernández-Llera and Delgado-Rivero 
(2008), but this is very unlikely applied under an economic crisis. 
The third alternative consists of improving the flexibility of the budgetary 
stability law, as it was finally enacted in 2006. From that year onwards, the goals of 
deficit or surplus are defined over the economic cycle, consistently with the Stability 
and Growth Pact (renewed in 2005). Also, the new budgetary stability legislation 
permits an additional deficit equivalent to 0.25% of regional GDP for each of the 
regions, according to the purpose of finance productive capital outlays3. Both conditions 
significantly improve the access to credit and thus the ACs’ ability to undertake new 
                                                          
2 Between 2002 and 2006, the outstanding debt of all the regions remained quite stable, with an average 
of 6.2% of GDP and always below 6.7%. The latter is the threshold that Alcalde-Fradejas and Vallés- 
Giménez (2002) had estimated as the ratio of debt which would involve the withdrawal of confidence by 
the financial market to the ACs. 
3 An assessment of budgetary stability legislation of 2006 can be found in Monasterio-Escudero y 
Fernández-Llera (2008).  
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 investment projects without resorting to tax increases. Finally, ACs must do from then 
on an effort of transparency, including the development of a full list (Inventario) with a 
precise setting down of their PSEs4. 
According to Marlow and Joulfaian (1989), governments always choose the 
funding sources with lower ‘relative costs’, given a complete set of revenues (general 
taxes, grants, service charges, user fees, borrowing, PPP and others). This insight is also 
pointed out by Monasterio-Escudero (1996), which warned that some selective 
borrowing constraints could lead to a ‘shift effect’ in Spain. This effect would bias the 
internal structure of the debt from those handling it more discretionary to others that are 
not subject to formal controls. In the same context, Polackova (1998) layed down that 
policymakers pursuing a balanced budget (or some deficit or debt target) tend to favour 
off-budget financing that do not require immediate cash and that, at least for some time, 
hide the underlying fiscal cost. The same author puts as  example the omission of net 
liabilities of public enterprises and agencies which are outside the sphere of general 
government but  benefit from government guarantees. 
As we previously mentioned, in the case of the current savings, ACs are 
struggling to increase, subsidies are declining and borrowing is more ‘expensive’ since 
the budgetary stability act was enacted. Thus, Spanish regions are deploying 
‘innovative’ mechanisms in order to continue to finance its growing level of spending, 
complying the objectives of deficit and debt. Some of the alternatives can be public-
private partnership (PPP), public entities and enterprises, or banking mechanisms (for 
instance, factoring, leasing, renting and confirming).  
                                                          
4 In fact, the Inventario had been already required from 2003 in Spain. Polackova (1998) suggested the 
elaboration of a full census of PSEs and a provision of their audited balance sheets and statements of 
contingent liabilities. 
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 A simple taxonomy classifies these ‘innovative’ instruments in two categories 
(Ezquiaga-Domínguez and Ferrero, 1997): ‘orthodox’ and ‘spurious’. The former ones 
provide additional revenues to the government, diversifying the risks and maintaining 
the sustainability of public finances5. On the other hand, the ‘spurious’ mechanisms are 
based on creative accounting (Milesi-Ferretti, 2004) which formally improves the 
amount of public debt, but they do not reflect a real improvement in government net 
wealth. The next sections will focus on the role played by public enterprises as well as a 
briefly introduction to PPP formulas.  
 
2.2. Public-private partnership as an alternative and a complement 
Following the European Commission (2004), the term PPP involves different 
“forms of cooperation between public authorities and the world of business which aim 
to ensure the funding, construction, renovation, management or maintenance of an 
infrastructure or the provision of a service”.  This broad and open definition includes 
the distinction between purely contractual PPP and institutionalised PPP. The latter is 
the most elaborated since it implies “the establishment of an entity held jointly by the 
public partner and the private partner”. Experiences with PPP have been diverse and 
extensive during the last years in the Member States of the EU, especially in UK. 
In Spain, we can find the earlier normative background in the Public Works 
General Act and the General Road Law, both are dated 1877. Nowadays, the Act 
13/1996 introduced the deferred payment of infrastructures in Spain, which is well-
known as the ‘german model’6. Recently, the Act 30/2007 introduced a detailed 
regulation in public procurement and PPP contracts, adapting the EU regulation at the 
                                                          
5 The paradigm is the project finance, which the only guarantee for borrowing are the cash flows 
generated by the project in the future (see for example Finnerty, 2007). 
6 This mechanism has been vastly implemented in Spain in order to streamline some infrastructures in the 
latter 1990s (Tribunal de Cuentas, 2006). With the ESA95 regulations, the ‘german model’ can be 
considered a ‘spurious’ mechanism (expenses must be charged as it is being executing).  
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 national level. Institutionalised PPP has a long tradition in Spanish local governments 
(Warner and Bel, 2008) and the ACs are developing these kind of entities in last years, 
for instance, in R+D projects, transport infrastructures and hospitals.  
The core advantage of the PPP is also the main reason for its arrangement: the 
obtaining of additional resources for the Public Sector and, simultaneously, the 
achievement of the deficit and debt limitations. In order to this condition fulfil, Eurostat 
(2004) recommends that the assets involved in a PPP should be classified as non-
government assets, and therefore recorded off balance sheet for government, if there is a 
complete risk transfer to the private sector. It implies that the private partner must 
support the construction risk, and at least one of either availability or demand risk. 
Other advantages of the PPP models can be given by the close implication of 
private firms in public objectives, as well as the potential attainment of efficiency gains 
from a value for money scheme. Nevertheless, there is no academic consensus about the 
second (Heald, 2003; Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). Also, the proliferation of PPP 
formulas may endanger the quality of public services –especially in education and 
health systems- because they promote a decreased transparency and a loss of control by 
citizens and legislators. In absence of adequate control and auditing, PPP could imply 
an overrun or, eventually, an increasing in user fees. This is because private companies 
make their investment decisions from a profit maximization point of view, based on the 
internal rate of return of the project, which is normally above the market interest rate 
(opportunity cost). Instead, Public Sector makes their investment decisions from a 
social viewpoint by taking into account a social internal rate of return. This rate takes 
account of the external (environmental) costs of the project. 
The European Commission (2003) has summarized the key factors that 
determine the success in a PPP. Mainly, it pointed out the efficient division of 
10
 responsibilities and risks among the government ant the private partner. The private 
sector wishes to contribute to the financial support of large scale projects, attracted by 
the potential rate of return. Beside it, Public Sector provides the operating rights, set the 
standards and contributes to funding. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006) show that, just behind United Kingdom, Spain 
is one of the Member States of the European Union with the largest number of PPP 
initiatives. In fact, there is a greater volume of investment developed through these 
mechanisms and more projects under consideration or in bidding. Furthermore, Spain 
has opened the fields in PPP, from the more traditional toll road, to others such as 
hospitals, prisons or water services infrastructures.  
The empirical literature about PPP formulas has not been very profuse in Spain 
till the moment. It is possible to find some partial reports that address topics and case 
studies, like the one of the Cámara de Comptos de Navarra (2007), which estimates the 
contingent liabilities of a shadow toll in a regional motorway. Instead, there are many 
theoretical papers and books on different economic, accounting and legal aspects of 
PPP7.  
 
3. The role of public sector enterprises 
3.1. Delimitation and growing of the public enterprises 
In many cases, ACs and the other tiers of government (central and local) in 
Spain have created PSEs to increase the debt outside the ‘perimeter of consolidation’ of 
the general government sector. In compliance with the ESA95 Manual on government 
deficit and debt (Eurostat, 2002), only the non-market public institutional unit must be 
                                                          
7 For example, Benito-López and Montesinos-Julve (2003), Acerete-Gil (2006) and González-García 
(2007). 
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 classified into the ‘general government’ sector and, therefore, within the ‘scope of 
consolidation’ of debt8. In summary, three conditions must be met simultaneously: 
a) Institutional unit: if the entity has autonomy of decision and a complete set of 
accounts. 
b) Public: when it is controlled by the general government. That means that the 
government officials have the ability to determine the general corporate policy or 
programme of an institutional unit by appointing appropriate directors or managers, 
if necessary. The control can be exercised either by owning more than half the 
shares of a corporation (sufficient condition) or ‘as a result of special legislation 
decree or regulation that empowers the government to determine corporate policy or 
to appoint the directors’. 
c) Non-market: either the unit redistributes national income and wealth or a maximum 
of the 50% of its production costs are covered by sales. 
Once the ‘perimeter of consolidation’ has been defined, governments should 
promote transparency of financial relations between government itself and public 
enterprises, in a double sense. First, it should bring under control the abuse of dominant 
position by public enterprises which have granted special or exclusive rights. Second, it 
seeks to control the financial relations between public enterprises and public 
administrations. Both issues have been regulated by Spanish Law 4/2007, which is 
mandatory for all the tiers of government. Eurostat (2002) also establishes that capital 
injections in public corporations will have no impact on the public deficit when they are 
considered as a financial transaction. Namely, when the general government receives in 
exchange a financial asset of equal value to the payment made to the public enterprise. 
                                                          
8 Some regional audit institutions (Cámara de Cuentas de Andalucía, 2006, 2009) have devoted specific 
audit reports to the implementation of ESA95 and the delimitation of the ‘perimeter of consolidation’. 
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 In any other case, the capital injections in PSEs will be considered as a capital transfer 
with a direct impact on the deficit.  
The optimal situation in order to allow market discipline run (Lane, 1993) takes 
place when the financial market does not judge PSEs as a mere ‘appendix’ of the 
general government but as an autonomous entity. Otherwise, the market may perceive a 
false and exaggerated PSEs’ solvency, given it is supported by the government. If this 
happened, there would be a problem of moral hazard for the perception of a soft budget 
constraint, based on a credible expectation of bailout. As stated by Fitch Ratings (2004), 
that situation occurs in three cases: (1) if there is a governmental statutory guarantee 
(universal and unlimited) to the PSEs; (2) if the PSES is benefited by a specific 
guarantee by the government (e.g. restricted to a particular debt issue) or, (3) if the 
government has subscribed a written and strong commitment with the PSEs. In these 
three cases, the rating of a PSEs is being automatically equated to that of its public 
sector guarantor. Otherwise, both ratings could differ on the basis of four attendant 
factors: legal status and institutional framework; integration between the PSES accounts 
with those of its owner; strategic importance of the PSES (including the nature of the 
services provided by the PSEs) and, finally, governmental control over the PSEs (the 
stronger the control, the narrower the rating differentiation). 
Table 1 shows that between 1997 and 2006 the Spanish ACs have established 
367 net PSEs (87% increase). The explanation for this growth can be given, first, by the 
intense process of competences transfer to the regions (especially in education and 
health), which has led to the deployment of new administrative and institutional 
structures in the ACs. The opposite effect is registered in the central government9. 
                                                          
9 In the case of the central government, it has been also added the effect of numerous privatizations 
carried out during the 1980s and 1990s (Guarnido-Rueda and Jaén-García, 2005). 
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 Secondly, the ‘shift effect’ that could has been caused by the stringent 2001 budgetary 
stability law. 
 
Table 1: Number of public enterprises in the ACs 
ACs ordered by 
PSEs number in 2006 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Δ 
1997-2006 
Δ% 
1997-2006 
Madrid 27 28 27 29 31 39 40 41 51 58 31 114.8 
Aragon 14 20 19 20 20 30 31 33 44 45 31 221.4 
Principality of Asturias 16 16 20 18 19 22 28 30 42 44 28 175.0 
Cantabria 8 8 11 17 18 15 20 23 29 38 30 375.0 
Balearic Islands 13 14 14 13 15 16 16 23 29 36 23 176.9 
Murcia 12 12 11 10 12 13 14 14 21 27 15 125.0 
Extremadura 18 19 17 17 17 15 15 16 23 24 6 33.3 
Castille and Leon 12 12 11 11 10 11 12 12 16 19 7 58.3 
Castille-La Mancha 1 1 2 2 2 3 8 8 14 19 18 1.800.0 
La Rioja 4 7 7 8 8 9 10 10 10 11 7 175.0 
‘Slow lane’ ACs 125 137 139 145 152 173 194 210 279 321 196 156.8 
Catalonia  45 62 65 66 70 76 90 95 104 110 65 144.4 
Basque Country  83 83 83 89 83 86 85 86 90 93 10 12.0 
Andalusia 42 46 56 56 61 63 66 66 66 76 34 81.0 
C. Valenciana 27 28 28 32 38 41 45 49 56 56 29 107.4 
Navarre 31 31 30 29 29 30 30 31 36 40 9 29.0 
Galicia 23 23 25 28 29 30 33 34 37 39 16 69.6 
Canary Islands 30 31 31 30 31 29 31 31 34 34 4 13.3 
‘Fast lane’ ACs 281 304 318 330 341 355 380 392 423 448 167 59.4 
ACs 406 441 457 475 493 528 574 602 702 771 365 89.9 
* It includes 2 public enterprises of various ACs in 2006. Source: IGAE, National Statistics Institute and own calculations. 
 
A simple descriptive analysis provides us some basic highlight. Previously, we 
split ACs in two categories which differ in the level of autonomy and the rhythm to get 
it. Thus, the so-called ‘fast lane’ ACs achieve more and faster autonomy, while the 
‘slow lane’ ACs entail a more limited and gradual gain of authority. The seven ‘fast 
lane’ regions had assumed major expenditure powers (basically, health and education) 
many years ago and, therefore, it may be plausible that they had already developed the 
bulk of their institutional sector (including the majority of own PSEs). In any case, this 
distinction among ACs is not significant from 2002 onwards. If we operate in this way, 
we can get a first approximation of the ‘shift effect’, at least as far as creating PSEs are 
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 concerned10. The data let us see that ‘slow lane’ regions recorded a growth of 156.8% in 
the number of PSEs, which seems a large percentage to be justified only as a 
mechanism for avoidance of debt. In contrast, the number of PSEs in the ‘fast lane’ ACs 
grew in the same period a 59.4%. Catalonia (+144.4%) and Valencia (+107.4%) clearly 
highlight within this latter group. However, as the Graph 2 shows, Cantabria, Navarre 
and Basque Country present the highest levels when computing the number of PSES per 
million inhabitants. 
 
Graph 2: PSES per million inhabitants (2006) 
Source: IGAE, National Statistics Institute and own calculations. 
 
For industries, according IGAE (2008), the common areas for many ACs in 
2006 are the following: infrastructure, broadcasting and corporate development and 
economic promotion. Moreover, in recent years have become more important PSES in 
health, education and R+D. The census (Inventario) of the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance (2009), referring to 1 July 2008, reflects that government-owned corporations 
                                                          
10 The 7 ‘fast lane’ ACs are Andalusia, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Comunidad Valenciana, Galicia, 
Navarre and Basque Country. The 10 ‘slow lane’ ACs are Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, 
Castille and Leon, Castille-La Mancha, Extremadura, Madrid, Murcia and La Rioja. 
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 (sociedades mercantiles) activities in the ACs are very diverse. They include real estate, 
renting and business services (20.4%), transportation, storage and communications 
(15.4%, including broadcasting) and construction (11.8%, including engineering civil 
works). 
  
Table 2: Outstanding debt in PSEs (% regional GDP) 
ACs ordered by 
percentage in 2006 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Average 
1994-2002 
Average
2003-2008
Balearic Islands 0.60 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.20 0.19 0.25 0.19 0.20 0.38 2.11 2.57 0.16 0.95
Castille-La Mancha 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.21 0.26 1.77 1.76 2.14 2.24 1.99 1.86 2.27 0.26 2.04
Aragon 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.53 0.56 0.44 0.29 0.67 0.90 0.04 0.57
Principality of Asturias 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.31 0.45 0.76 0.67 0.15 0.40
Madrid 0.68 0.66 0.58 0.64 0.65 1.16 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.43 0.38 0.32 0.56 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.47
La Rioja 0.29 0.21 0.23 0.32 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.05 0.13 0.39 0.22 0.30 0.18 0.21
Castille and Leon 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.10
Cantabria 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.12
Murcia 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.02
Extremadura 0.11 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.07
‘Slow lane’ ACs 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.22 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.30 0.37 0.15 0.24
Catalonia 1.00 0.88 0.89 0.96 1.05 1.14 0.79 0.94 1.19 1.77 1.78 2.01 2.23 2.34 2.83 0.98 2.16
C. Valenciana 0.33 0.45 0.50 0.39 0.39 0.68 1.41 1.71 1.82 1.90 1.77 1.70 1.77 1.72 1.89 0.85 1.79
Navarre 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.22 0.45 0.48 0.39 0.39 1.03 0.87 1.39 1.57 0.24 0.94
Basque Country 0.18 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.19 0.14 0.32 0.69 0.74 0.63 0.58 0.83 0.81 0.11 0.71
Canary Islands 0.16 0.12 0.22 0.53 0.58 0.57 0.74 0.80 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.57 0.52 0.51 0.58 0.52 0.69
Galicia 0.37 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.35 0.44 0.54 0.07 0.24
Andalusia 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.22 0.11
‘Fast lane’ ACs 0.37 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.45 0.57 0.68 0.80 0.96 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.21 1.37 0.46 1.09
Total ACs 0.43 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.57 0.45 0.51 0.63 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.90 0.99 1.16 0.46 0.91
Central government 2.79 3.49 2.75 2.33 2.07 1.77 1.69 1.54 1.43 1.50 1.14 1.27 1.43 1.72 1.95 2.21 1.50
Local governments 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.45 0.52 0.30 0.42
TOTAL 3.58 4.18 3.42 3.01 2.75 2.58 2.46 2.38 2.39 2.68 2.31 2.47 2.72 3.17 3.63 2.97 2.83
Source: Banco de España, National Statistics Institute and own calculations. 
 
In order to complete this first descriptive approach, Table 2 presents the figures 
of the outstanding debt of PSEs11. The hypothesis is that the budgetary stability law has 
encouraged more intensive use of this type of debt outside of the ‘perimeter of 
consolidation’ of the ACs. To test, a cut-off point between 2002 and 2003, coinciding 
with the time of entry into force of the first budgetary stability law (enacted in 2001). 
                                                          
11 The generic heading ‘public enterprises’ includes all the entities outside the government sector and, 
therefore, outside the ‘perimeter of consolidation’. 
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 The calculations of the Banco de España (the Spanish Central Bank) are made by 
means of the same methodology of the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit to facilitate 
comparison with the public debt in the strict sense. 
Indeed, it appears that the debt of the regional PSEs has continued increasing, 
with minimal exceptions, since the first year of the series. This growth strengthens from 
2003 onwards, after the full entry into force of the first budgetary stability law. This is 
particularly relevant in the ‘fast lane’ ACs group. Actually, that fact suggests that these 
regional governments are being used to get debt out of the ‘perimeter of consolidation’. 
This ‘shift effect’ is also perceptible in the ‘slow lane’ regions, singularly in Balearic 
Islands and Castilla-La Mancha. Local governments seem to have followed a similar 
pattern, but not the central government for the reasons noted above. In 2008 the total 
outstanding debt of Spanish PSES was walking towards 4% of GDP, one third of the 
ACs. 
Given the descriptive analysis, it can be concluded that the ACs have created 
more PSEs and they have moved more borrowing outside the ‘perimeter of 
consolidation’. Both effects have increased since the entry into force of the first 
budgetary stability law. The smaller pace of debt accumulation in the ‘slow lane’ 
regions may perhaps be due to the limited time frame which runs from the creation of 
their PSEs.  
 
 
 
3.2. Public sector efficiency and PSEs 
In the field of public sector efficiency, one of the most intense discussions has 
focused on the comparison of several managerial schemes. However, almost all the 
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 studies have emphasized the comparison between public and private management. In 
this respect, Lovell and Muñiz (2003) pointed out that efficiency depends more on the 
degree of competition in the sector analyzed than on other institutional or managerial 
factors. However, there are no studies which have found out about the most adequate 
institutional framework in efficiency terms, with the exception of some formulas of 
joint management, especially applied by the local governments to take advantage of 
economies of scale. As the objective of this paper is evaluate the impact of public firms 
on regional sector efficiency, the way to test that hypothesis will consist of analyzing 
efficiency from a global point of view. That is, it would be necessary to evaluate the 
whole activity of regional governments.   
Previous literature has shown that the measurement of public sector efficiency 
from a global point of view is not an easy task. The most correct methodological 
orientation would lead to evaluate the efficiency of each public service, especially 
focusing on those public services which have a significant weight in public sector 
budget. Separate analysis is the best option due to the existence of different 
technologies in each case. Thus, cost and production functions are not the same in the 
case education, health or cultural services. However, data requirements to do that are 
really exigent. As a consequence, other kind of methodologies has been proposed, 
which consider the whole public sector as a multi-output producer.   
Initially, it is necessary to set which kind of efficiency is more adequate in each 
context. When we have the aim of calculating efficiency from a global point of view we 
found that, several studies have considered cost efficiency analysis, instead of technical 
efficiency. Giménez and Prior (2003), pointed out two main reasons to specify cost 
efficiency models. First of all, they argued the financial constrains in the public sector 
which lead to reduce public expenditure. This aim would not be reached if we used 
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 technical efficiency. Second, cost efficiency is clearly linked to results, so usually cost 
deviations are the instrument to control public sector, from an economic and financial 
point of view.  
Additionally, there is another significant problem in this field. Usually, public 
services output is actually very difficult to measure (García-Valiñas, 2000; García-
Valiñas et al., 2005). Generally speaking, services outputs are intangibles and not too 
much easy to quantify. In this respect, quality issues matter and it is necessary to 
measure them too. Moreover, a multi-objective public sector tries to produce several 
outputs at the same time. As Rueda-López (2003) pointed out, sometimes it is not 
possible to set public sector output and to use market prices to value it. Thus, the 
valuation of public sector production is a really complicated aim. In the Spanish case, 
National and Regional Accounts approximate the value of public sector output by 
means of production costs. So, that fact makes impossible to consider Added Value 
calculated in National or Regional Accounts as an output variable in an efficiency 
analysis.  
Due the difficulties of setting accurate output variables, sometimes variables of 
intermediate output have been proposed. Those variables are easy to calculate, but they 
are not represent the real output. For example, to evaluate the efficiency of local 
governments, several output indicators have been considered (Hayes and Chang, 1990; 
Vanden Eackaut et al., 1993; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; Gimenez and Prior, 2003; 
Balaguer, 2004). Among others, we can mention the population, the number of 
kilometres of municipally roads, the number of people older than 65, the number of 
students in primary schools or the volume of waste in the municipality. As it is possible 
to observe, all are related to the demand of services, but they are not outputs.  
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 In the same direction goes Rueda-López (2003), who proposed a set of 
indicators for each category of public services or functions, in order to evaluate the 
production of Spanish public sector. The number of cases solved by the law system 
(justice) or by the heath system (health services), the number of students (education), 
the number of unemployed and retired people (social services), the number of travellers 
per km (transportation), or the number of subsidized housing (housing and urban 
planning) are some examples to approximate public sector output. Anyway, with this 
kind of indexes we are assuming an error when we try to measure public services 
output. 
With regard to the specific method to calculate efficiency indexes, there is a 
broad diversity of parametric and non-parametric techniques12. However, Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric technique especially suited to analyze 
efficiency in the public sector. In fact, the majority of previously mentioned studies 
have applied that technique. DEA, based on mathematical programming, has evolved 
significantly since it originally appeared in the paper by Charnes et al. (1978). 
Assuming homogeneous productive units, a frontier formed by efficient units is 
designed. Thus, several extensions of the basic methodology have since appeared, 
adapting the original technique to the features of different sectors, to the nature of the 
variables used, or to the objectives involved13.  
However, sometimes not so much complex methodologies have been applied, 
such as ratios or aggregated indexes analysis. This is a more operative method usually 
applied from an institutional point of view. Thus, Rueda-López (2003) carried out a 
multi-country comparison, pointing out that the efficiency ranking using DEA was 
                                                          
12 For example, see Álvarez-Pinilla (2001) 
13 See Cooper et al. (2004) and Thanassoulis (2001). 
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 similar to the efficiency ranking obtained from ratios or global indicators. However, 
with DEA analysis, efficiency levels were a little bit higher. 
Definitively, measuring public sector output is complicated, especially if we talk 
about public services supplied through PSEs. Several methodologies have been 
proposed, but the most difficult task will be to define and calculate indexes or proxies 
which approximate accurately that output. Usually, some of the techniques previously 
mentioned are extraordinary sensitive to the variables included into the analysis. So, it 
is necessary to be careful in this respect. 
 
4. Previous research 
There is a broad literature related to the ‘shift effect’, which in this context 
broadly means to use both budget and off-budget mechanisms to avoid the stringent 
borrowing constrains. Empirical evidence shows that borrowing growth by means of 
PSEs is directly related to the presence of very stringent fiscal rules. In general, since 
the legal restrictions are passed to control subnational debt, many governments have 
used different ‘public authorities’ and PSEs in order to ‘shift’ borrowing and debt 
outside the scope of consolidation. 
In US, the relationship between fiscal rules, borrowing and the ‘shift effect’ 
began to be analyzed several years ago (Pogue, 1970). The main rational for this fact is 
the variety of fiscal rules across States (ACIR, 1987; NASBO, 1992; GAO, 1993; 
Gordon, 2008). Many years ago, Kimball (1976) suggested that the increase in the 
number of public authorities (a form of special-purpose government) may be partially 
due to a sort of spillover effect, whereby states mimic the neighbouring states’ 
behaviour. According to the previous idea, Bennet y DiLorenzo (1982, 1983) illustrates 
the topic describing the bankruptcy of New York City in 1975. Debt growth was 
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 produced due to the failure in compliance with the fiscal discipline, using financial 
tricks like the reclassification of current expenditures in capital expenditures, resulting 
in an excessive borrowing and debt.  
Marlow and Joulfaian (1989) show that tax and expenditure limitations inherited 
from the 1970’s tax revolt –including the famed California Proposition 13- lead States 
to shift revenue sources away from general taxes and toward revenue sources such as 
service charges, user fees and, also, some off-budget operations. In a national survey, 
Hackbart and Leigland (1990) report an increase in the number of state-level entities 
that issue revenue-backed debt of almost 60 percentage points.  
The literature was especially profuse during the 1990s. Von Hagen (1991) 
compares the States that set debt constraints with those states that do not have any 
restriction. On average, it is observed that States with financial constraints showed a 
higher proportion of non-guaranteed debt (1.18 percentage points higher) than States 
with no restrictions. Similarly, Bunch (1991) tests the impact of constitutional debt 
limits on the number of public authorities, the scope of their activities, the existence of a 
public building authority, and the state’s reliance on these entities to issue debt for 
infrastructure creation. The author finds that States with a constitutional debt limit that 
encompasses both general obligation and revenue bonds have a higher number of public 
authorities and they perform much more activities. Nonetheless, such results do not 
exist if the constitutional limitation applies only to general obligation debt. States with 
debt limits are also more likely to have a public building authority and to finance their 
public infrastructure debt through public authorities. Leigland (1994), after reviewing 
the vague concept of public authority, runs an empirical analysis to explore the 
determinants of the use of this kind of entities in US. He concludes that arounding debt 
limits (‘shift effect’), rather than business-like management, accounts for the 
22
 proliferation of public authorities which are usually associated with lower levels of 
creditworthiness. 
The results by Merrifield (1994) are quite similar, but in this case the statistical 
significance is quite poor. Similarly, Kiewiet y Szakaly (1996) identify another type of 
‘shif effect’: the states with more stringent fiscal rules show the higher levels of the 
local governments’ debt. For local governments, Wallis and Weingast (2008) argue that 
some public authorities (the special-purpose districts) may be a consequence of the 
limits to local borrowing paired with an evolution of financing needs.  
All these results for the US must be analyzed with caution, given the fact that the 
sense and the magnitude of the ‘sift effect’ depends critically on the sample and the 
time series data. For example, Trautman (1995) finds that restrictions on general 
obligation debt alone do not have a significant impact on the number of public 
authorities. Also, Frant (1997) fails to find a relationship between debt restrictions and 
either the number of public authorities or their issued debt (he says public authorities 
are not mere ‘borrowing machines’). The author hypothesizes that purely fiscal 
motivations are not primary determinants of the use of public authorities. More recently, 
Bourdeaux (2005) also finds that it is not only financial concerns that bring about the 
creation of a public authority. In addition, politically competitive environments are also 
a relevant factor. 
In Spain, some authors have provided intuition about the ‘shift effect’ 
(Monasterio-Escudero, 1996). However, the empirical works assessing the relationship 
between fiscal rules (deficit or debt limitations) and PSEs growth (number of entities 
and indebtness) is yet quite scarce.  Several papers, articles and books are limited to 
observe and describe the growth of PSEs, without inquiring into the causes of the 
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 phenomenon, beyond the intuitive explanations14. We can justify this lack of empirical 
studies because, unlike what happens in the U.S., ACs and local governments in Spain 
are subject to the same legal restrictions (budgetary stability law). There is another 
reason in the case of ACs: the relatively recent formation of PSEs (accelerated since 
2002, as seen in Table 1), although in some regions the process began much earlier. 
Both reasons make difficult a comparative analysis among jurisdictions. 
Thus, Monasterio-Escudero et al. (1999) attempted to delve into the reasons for 
the growing number of PSEs (corporations only) and off-budget debt in the ACs. The 
authors found a significant growth in both variables between 1990 and 1997, attributing 
it to the deviations of debt in the CCAA with respect to the targets set, although they 
were not able to prove this hypothesis, due to lack of disaggregated data by ACs.  
Fernández-Llera (2005) found significant evidence for the ‘shift’ effect 
hypothesis in the ACs (1995-2003 data), concluding that ACs use more intensively the 
PSEs when they are beset by the proximity (or overflow) to their deficit and debt 
limitations. The author also found a significant positive relationship between the 
number of PSEs and the long-term debt outside the ‘scope of consolidation’. The results 
in Cuadrado-Roura and Carrillo-Neff (2008) are to some extent consistent with the 
previous ones. The authors’ endogenous variable is the change in the number of PSEs 
(1998-2004) and they detect a direct and significant correlation between this variable 
and the total public debt (summing up general government debt and PSEs’ debt) in 
1998. In other words, the most indebted regions at the beginning of the period also have 
significantly increased the size of its public business sector as a way to obtain additional 
financial resources.  
                                                          
14 See, among others, Gómez-Agustín (2006) and Utrilla de la Hoz (2006). Also the web page of the 
Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance (www.meh.es).  
24
 Unfortunately, the studies that analyze efficiency of public sector from a global 
point of view are not very usual. As we mentioned previously, the empirical evidence is 
even slighter in the Spanish case, both at local level and at ACs’ level15 (Bosch et al., 
2003). Many of them use municipal data (Giménez and Prior, 2003; Balaguer, 2004), 
and it is very infrequent to find studies evaluating efficiency in the regional level of 
government in Spain16. In general, the conclusions of these partial studies are not clear 
at all. Although it could be expected that more specialized organizations were more 
efficient, such an intuition is not always true.   
Specifically with relation to PSEs there exist several theoretical approaches and 
international evidence on efficiency: competitiveness and predation of competitors 
(Lott, 1990); the role of X-inefficiency in PSEs (De Fraja, 1993); efficiency and 
privatizations (Anderson et al., 1997); ownership, efficiency and political interference 
(Willner, 2001). For Spain, see Urueña Gutiérrez (2004), Hernández de Cos (2004) and 
Vergés-Jaime (2007), among others. 
This paper is directly linked to relevant research areas in the field of Public 
Economics, from both international and Spanish points of view. The first area is related 
to the determinants of borrowing (Bayar and Smeets, 2009). The second one is linked to 
fiscal rules about debt and deficit (Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997). The third is related 
to the hypothesis about the soft budget constraint in the case of subnational 
governments (Inman, 2003). Finally, the fourth area is linked to the evaluation of public 
sector efficiency (Lovell and Muñiz, 2003). 
                                                          
15 In this respect, and due to the methodological problems linked to global analysis efficiency, is more 
usual to find empirical studies that have separately evaluated the efficiency of specific public services. 
There are some empirical studies in Spain which have analyzed justice (Pedraja and Salinas, 1995), 
education (Mancebón, 1998; Muñiz, 2001; Giménez, 2004; Cordero-Ferrera et al., 2005; Mancebón y 
Muñiz, 2008), health (Rodriguez-Álvarez, 2003) or refuse collection services (Bosch et al. 2000). 
16 Some regional –and also the supreme- external audit institutions in Spain have recently introduced this 
concern in their respective annual planning and their audit reports. See, for instance, Cámara de Cuentas 
de Andalucía (2004) on pharmaceutical spending in public hospitals.  
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5. A model for public sector enterprises debt 
5.1. Theoretical patterns 
A) Basic model 
Our main purpose is to investigate which are the most relevant factors that have 
influenced the accumulation of debt through the PSEs. Therefore, we try to test for the 
‘shift effect’ (Monasterio-Escudero, 1996) that we have exposed above. On the other 
hand, we also test for the ‘efficiency effect’, to be exact, we check if aggregate 
efficiency improvements might reduce the debt of the PSEs. In any case, Eurostat 
consolidation debt rules (Eurostat, 2002) will be considered. Table A1 in the Appendix 
summarizes the variables we use in the model, including the two instruments for IV 
estimation.  
The first hypothesis states that the number of PSEs (NPSE) may increase debt 
accumulation outside the scope of consolidation, as the descriptive analysis (tables 1 
and 2) seems to suggest. In some sense, regional governments and the PSEs themselves 
are using these legal structures in a way to increase their activities and consequently 
their debt, following the classical arguments on bureaucracy (Niskanen, 1971) and the 
Leviathan process (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). While private firms’ aim is profit 
maximization, PSEs may contribute to inefficient production through budget 
maximization processes and agency costs (Krishnaswamy et al., 1994; Bartel and 
Harrison, 2005).  
Secondly, we try to connect the deviation from the legal restrictions in terms of 
deficit with the current level of debt. Following the previous research for USA and 
Spain, we suggest that if a regional government significantly overflowed its deficit 
objective in the last year, it might present structural financing needs which are –at least, 
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 partially- canalized through PSEs. If this was the case, the government would be more 
prone to use the PSEs in order to obtain additional resources. The final consequence 
would be increasing borrowing and higher debt outside the scope of consolidation. We 
define a new variable (OBJ) as the positive deviation from the deficit objective, 
computed in terms of regional GDP. If an Autonomous Community breaks his deficit 
objective in the previous year, the variable will take a positive value. Otherwise, if an 
Autonomous Community accomplish its deficit objective (real deficit is equal or bellow 
the upper bound of deficit), the new variable equals zero. This is because the 
requirements in the Spanish Budgetary Stability Act are ‘asymmetric’, in the sense that 
the law only provides sanctions for defaulters, but no ‘awards’ for fulfilment. In order to 
complete this test, we control for the entry into force of the Budgetary Stability Act in 
2002 by using a dummy variable (DNEP). Previously to 2002 the coordination of deficit 
and debt was much more slightly in Spain. The unique coordination schemes were the 
so-called Budget Consolidation Scenarios which consist in bilateral political 
agreements between the central government and each of the ACs. Many of those 
agreements were unfulfilled or even revised in favour of the most indebted ACs. 
Nevertheless, the Budget Consolidation Scenarios have contributed to general fiscal 
consolidation in Spain during the nineteen’s (Vallés-Giménez and Zárate-Marco, 2003). 
The third independent variable that is introduced into the model tries to connect 
the aggregate efficiency of public services with the accumulation of debt in public 
enterprises. The main problem lies precisely in the difficulties to measure efficiency in 
the Public Sector, as we previously mentioned. Moreover, the difficulty for evaluating 
the aggregate efficiency of PSEs is very high. Here we introduce the apparent 
productivity of labour in the non-market services (PRODCTV) as a proxy for global 
efficiency in every Autonomous Community. This kind of services are not intended for 
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 sale, i.e. all the ‘free’ services for the citizen-user, mostly financed by taxes and offered 
by the Public Sector (including PSEs). This category includes basic public services (e.g. 
education, health and social services), public goods (e.g. street lighting, security) or 
natural monopolies (e.g. basic road and water infrastructures). It is expected that lower 
productivity in non-market services may result in (indirect) effect on the amount of 
PSEs debt given that some of those services are provided by PSEs, together with the 
regional Public Administration itself. Maybe this is the most innovative –and risky- 
issue of our paper. However, it is relevant in the sense that this coefficient in the model 
will give us some clues about the so-called 'efficiency effect' in relation to PSEs and 
their debt. 
We also include a vector of political indicators which includes a set of four 
dummy variables. The first one reflects the electoral cycle in each of the ACs (CYC), 
distinguishing only the year in which there are regional parliamentary elections. The 
second variable indicates the alternation of ruling party during the period (DALTGOB), 
namely, the existence of at least one change in the party in charge of government 
between 1994 and 2008. Thirdly, the ideology of the regional government (DIDEOL), 
disregarding the Spanish party system and electoral rules (Llera-Ramo, 1998) and the 
existence of regional political parties with significant influence in national politics 
(Lago-Peñas and Montero, 2008). Finally, the fourth political variable is partisan 
alignment (DALIG), a dummy indicating if the regional government is or not aligned 
with the central one in terms of ideology. Following Solé-Ollé and Sorribas (2008) and 
Arulampalam et al. (2009) we consider the two governments are aligned when they are 
controlled by the same party (either as a majority party in regional parliament or as the 
leader of a broader coalition). 
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 In the basic specification of the model we have included the indicator HIGH as a 
control variable, which is the combination between the GDP per capita (GDPPC) and 
the indicator for the ‘fast lane’ ACs. The variable HIGH condenses in a unique indicator 
the fiscal capacity of the jurisdiction and the financial differences that are dependent on 
the expenditure competences. It is plausible that high-responsibility regions show a 
different pattern, given the fact that health, education and social services expenditures 
together take up 2/3 of total regional outlays. Also, these expenditures are income 
elastic, much more than the expenditures which are common to all ACs (Garcia-Milà et 
al., 2001). This intuition is even likely after 2002 when the homologation of 
expenditure responsibilities among all the regions took place 17. 
The general formulation of the basic model is as follows: 
),,,,,,( XPPRODCTVNEPOBJLNPSEEFfPSED =             (1) 
The variables NPSE, OBJL, DNEP and PRODCTV will be used to test the main 
hypotheses of the model. The vector P contains the four political variables, EF 
represents the individual fixed effects (when they are considered) and X is the control 
variable (HIGH). Indeed, we try to isolate the ‘shift effect’ and the ‘efficiency effect’ as 
we previously mentioned. 
 
B) Instrumental variables estimation 
Although the results for the basic model are quite satisfactory, it could be 
reasonable to think that the number of PSEs (NPSE) and their outstanding debt (PSED) 
should be simultaneously determined. In such a case we will need to control for this 
potential endogeneity in order to improve the efficiency of the model. Therefore, we fit 
a linear regression of equation 1 using instrumental variables (IV) with a two-stage least 
                                                          
17 At least until 2008, when our study ends. 
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 square estimator (2SLS). We need a vector of variables (Z) which are correlated with 
the instrumented variable (NPSE) and they are not with the error term (ε). The 2SLS 
estimator chooses the linear combination of Z that is most highly correlated with the 
first-stage endogenous variable (NPSE). In that way, we obtain the most efficient IV 
estimator in the case. 
In our case, we make use of two instruments for the variable NPSE. The first 
instrument is the one lag of the public debt variable (DEBTL), i.e. the debt inside the 
perimeter of consolidation. The second instrument is the one lag of the ACs’ capital 
expenditure (INVL), to be precise, real investment outlays which are directly executed 
by regional governments18. It is assumed that the most indebted ACs in the past (using 
the consolidated debt) should appeal more to the creation of PSEs in order to deviate 
certain activities and diversify financial revenues. By the same reasoning, the regions 
with highest level of real direct investment in the past now have more current 
expenditures associated with personnel costs and the maintenance of the quality 
standards relating to the delivery of the public service. 
In order to correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity, we compute the 
robust covariance matrix with the Huber-White sandwich estimator for the pooled-IV 
model in place of the traditional calculation of errors (Hardin, 2003). 
We also check that the instrumental variables do verify the two conditions for 
suitability, namely, the relevance (correlation between Zit and NPSEit differs from 0) 
and the exogeneity (correlation between Zit and uit equals to zero). The former can be 
simply analyzed from the matrix of correlations (Table 4) and they are full verified with 
a Wald test in order to check whether the coefficients for the variables DEBTL and 
INVL are simultaneously equal to zero in the first-stage estimation. We are able to reject 
                                                          
18 Capital grants paid by ACs to other entities are excluded because many of the potential receptors are 
the just the PSEs. The auxiliary estimations we run endorse the prior intuition.   
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 the null hypothesis (p-value=0.0000), indicating that the coefficients for DEBTL and 
INVL are not simultaneously equal to zero, meaning that the inclusion of these variables 
create a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the model. Finally, the 
exogeneity of the instruments is also fulfilled by construction because uit (error term in 
year t) is uncorrelated with DEBTL and INVL (both referred to year t-1). In addition, we 
try to capture and compare the combined time-series cross-section data by using the IV 
and 2SLS for panel-data models, both with random and fixed effects. 
Finally, our own intuition and the previous research suggest that the range of 
competences in the ACs clearly determines the behaviour of the regional governments 
in terms of creation of PSEs and debt accumulation outside the scope of consolidation. 
Therefore, we split the sample into two groups of regions and the model is estimated 
separately for the two subsamples: (1) ACs with broad responsibility over expenditure 
programs since before 2002 (Andalusia, Canary Islands, Catalonia, C. Valenciana, 
Galicia, Navarre and Basque Country); (2) the remaining 10 ACs. In order to avoid 
endogeneity problems with the grouping variable we replace HIGH (which is defined 
on the basis on such a criterion) for GDPPC as the control variable. As we will see, the 
results in the descriptive statistics and in the estimation are conclusive in this sense. 
 
5.2. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
The analysis is focused in the 17 ACs in Spain during the period 1994-2008, 
using an unbalanced panel for all the regional governments. The time series is 
especially significant for several institutional reasons. First of all, because the Spanish 
Central Bank became independent from the government in 1994, leaving monetary 
policy solely in its hands from onwards that moment. Secondly, the Euro was set as the 
common currency in EMU at 1-1-1999, so the common monetary policy in EMU will 
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 be implemented by the European Central Bank since that date. Third, the 
homogenization of ACs’ expenditure policies was carried out, especially from 2002, 
with the transfer to AC of health expenditures management. And, finally, a new fiscal 
rule was introduced in Spain consisting in annual equilibrium for all levels of 
governments (2002-2007) and, afterwards a cyclical management of public finances 
(from 2007 onwards).  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics (numerical variables) 
 Uds.  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.  
PSED € / inhabitant overall 77.83 109.95 0.00 611.68 N 255 
  between 77.99 1.13 292.68 n 17 
  within 79.63 -77.16 508.61 t 15 
NPSE number overall 30.4 23.5 1.0 110.0 N 221 
  between 22.4 5.1 88.3 n 17 
  within 8.9 -0.4 69.6 t 13 
OBJ % regional GDP overall 0.13 0.29 0.00 1.76 N 255 
  between 0.13 0.01 0.50 n 17 
  within 0.26 -0.38 1.59 t 15 
PRODCTV € / employee overall 24146.24 2307.63 20611.10 30725.56 N 238 
  between 1956.44 21010.62 27912.48 n 17 
  within 1306.70 20819.89 29275.97 t 14 
DEBTL € / inhabitant overall 825.62 399.49 248.61 1962.98 N 238 
  between 347.93 432.44 1582.91 n 17 
  within 212.56 113.98 1478.27 t 14 
INVL € / inhabitant overall 223.66 108.04 50.33 586.66 N 238 
  between 83.24 115.80 371.24 n 17 
  within 71.58 -53.22 553.43 t 14 
GDPPC € / inhabitant overall 16136.91 3781.77 8177.84 25337.73 N 255 
  between 3243.22 10707.89 21356.67 n 17 
  within 2088.78 9577.57 21252.66 t 15 
HIGH € / inhabitant overall 6818.70 8548.26 0.00 25337.73 N 255 
  between 8672.65 0.00 20647.80 n 17 
  within 1415.47 1719.53 11934.45 t 15 
               Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive panel statistics for the numerical variables and 
Table 4 encloses the correlation matrix. Regional consumer price index (Spanish 
National Statistics Institute data, base 2001=100) is used to deflact all the monetary 
variables. Also, these variables are normalized by population. As we can see, both 
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 NPSE and PSED have a high variability that comprises from zero to 611.68 Euros in the 
former and from 1 to 110 PSEs in the latter. The maximum deviation from the deficit 
target amounts to 1.76% of GDP (about 40% of the total number of observations are 
positive values). For the rest of variables, perhaps the highlight is the important 
variability of GDPPC, PRODCTV and even more DEBTL, indicative of large 
interregional differences in terms of per capita debt. 
 
Table 4: Matrix of correlations 
 PSED NPSE OBJ_1 DNEP PRODCTV DCYC DALT DIDEOL DALIG DEBTL INVL GDPPC DAMP HIGH
PSED 1.0000      
NPSE 0.4516 1.0000     
OBJ_1 0.2158 -0.0226 1.0000    
DNEP 0.3259 0.2306 0.1542 1.0000   
PRODCTV 0.1108 0.3110 -0.0709 0.3405 1.0000   
DCYC 0.0095 -0.0192 -0.0777 -0.0837 -0.0677 1.0000   
DALT -0.0321 -0.0534 -0.0766 0.0000 -0.3699 0.0106 1.0000   
DIDEOL 0.0230 0.0251 -0.0084 0.1237 -0.0219 0.0473 -0.1350 1.0000   
DALIG 0.0661 0.0550 -0.0710 -0.1704 0.0008 -0.0651 0.0988 -0.2887 1.0000   
DEBTL 0.4997 0.6141 0.1416 0.1245 0.0699 -0.0158 0.2297 -0.1287 0.1615 1.0000   
INVL -0.1821 -0.2145 0.0575 0.3044 0.3727 -0.0202 0.0852 0.1013 -0.0415 -0.0514 1.0000  
GDPPC 0.4120 0.4056 0.0679 0.3755 0.3458 -0.0731 0.2994 -0.3189 0.0671 0.4269 -0.0184 1.0000 
DAMP 0.3480 0.6611 0.0160 0.0000 0.3334 0.0134 -0.1690 -0.1496 0.1455 0.6112 -0.0479 0.1009 1.0000
HIGH 0.4457 0.7180 -0.0068 0.0695 0.4445 0.0114 -0.1133 -0.1882 0.1501 0.6432 -0.0261 0.2829 0.9591 1.0000
Source: Own elaboration 
 
As we earlier announced, the descriptive analysis is supplemented by splitting 
the sample into two groups of ACs, classified according to their expenditure powers by 
2002. Clearly, ‘fast lane’ ACs have on average much more debt outside the scope of 
consolidation than the ‘slow lane’ ones (116.78 versus 50.57 Euros). The former also 
have more PSEs than the latter (48.70 versus 17.60) and a higher level of debt inside the 
perimeter of consolidation (1092.20 versus 639.01 Euros). On the contrary, the ‘slow 
lane’ ACs exhibit higher levels both in the deviation of the deficit target and real 
investment. There are no major differences between the two groups neither in 
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 PRODCTV nor in GDPPC. Finally, as it is obvious by construction, the variable HIGH 
takes null values for the ‘slow lane’ regions. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for categories of ACs (numerical variables) 
 Uds. ACs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
PSED € / inhabitant ‘Fast lane’ 116.78 128.46 1.80 611.68 105 
  ‘Slow lane’ 50.57 85.27 0 526.32 150 
NPSE number  ‘Fast lane’ 48.70 24.64 17 110 91 
  ‘Slow lane’ 17.60 10.85 1 58 130 
OBJ % regional GDP ‘Fast lane’ 0.1172 0.2578 0 1.2736 105 
  ‘Slow lane’ 0.1402 0.3079 0 1.7623 150 
PRODCTV € / employee ‘Fast lane’ 24994.10 2532.16 20989.01 30725.56 98 
  ‘Slow lane’ 23552.74 1934.83 20611.10 29578.79 140 
DEBTL € / inhabitant ‘Fast lane’ 1092.20 415.31 248.61 1962.98 98 
  ‘Slow lane’ 639.01 258.02 276.91 1504.03 140 
INVL € / inhabitant ‘Fast lane’ 208.78 90.15 103.94 451.18 98 
  ‘Slow lane’ 234.07 118.18 50.33 586.66 140 
GDPPC € / inhabitant ‘Fast lane’ 16559.70 3950.57 9389.34 25337.73 105 
  ‘Slow lane’ 15840.95 3643.15 8177.84 24937.00 150 
HIGH € / inhabitant ‘Fast lane’ 16559.70 3950.57 9389.34 25337.73 105 
  ‘Slow lane’ 0 0 0 0 150 
               Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
5.3. Empirical specification and results  
We run the estimation of the basic model in two different ways. First of all, we 
run the OLS pooled estimation without the variable PRODCTV and without the vector 
of political variables (equation 2). Secondly, we also include the PRODCTV variable 
(equation 3) and, finally, we run the OLS estimation with PRODCTV and political 
variables (equation 4). The general equations will be:  
itititititit XDNEPOBJNPSEPSED εβββββ +++++= − 431210     (2) 
ititititititit eXPRODCTVDNEPOBJNPSEPSED ++++++= − 5431210 γγγγγγ   (3) 
itititititititit XPPRODCTVDNEPOBJNPSEPSED ξηηαηηηηη +++++++= − 65431210  (4) 
The subscript i refers to ACs and t to years; α0, β0 and η0 are the intercepts; Pit 
represents the vector of political variables; Xit is the control variable (HIGH); εit, eit and 
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 ζit are the error terms (we assume white noises). Next, we include the political variables 
and we perform the GLS specification. Equation 5 shows the generalized random 
effects model and equation 6 shows the generalized fixed effects specification. Note that 
αi=α+ui; υi is a vector of individual fixed effects; φit and ωit are the error terms (we 
assume white noises). 
itititititititiit XPPRODCTVDNEPOBJNPSEPSED ϕλλλλλλα +++++++= − 6543121  (5) 
itititititititiit XPPRODCTVDNEPOBJNPSEPSED ωφφφφφφυ +++++++= − 6543121  (6) 
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects clearly 
recommends this alternative instead of OLS estimation in all the specifications (p-
value=0.0000 in all the models). Also, we test for all state dummies are equal to zero in 
the fixed effects model. The F-test indicates that we reject the null hypothesis, so it is 
preferable to use the fixed effects model instead of the OLS regression (p-value=0.0000 
in all the models). Additionally, the Hausman specification test concludes that the fixed 
effects model is preferred to random effects estimation (the highest p-value is 0.0003). 
So we use the fixed effects estimation to perform the tests for autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation (models 3, 6 and 9 in Table 6). 
According to Wooldridge (2002) and Drukker (2003), we control for serial 
correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of the panel data model. The null hypothesis is no 
first-order autocorrelation and we reject it at the 1% level in all the cases (the highest p-
value is 0.0040 in model 3). To test for the variances, we calculate a modified Wald 
statistic for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the residuals, following Greene (2000: 
598). The null hypothesis is that all the variances are equal for every cross-sectional 
units and we reject it at 1% level in al the models (p-value=0.0000). Finally, the 
Breusch-Pagan statistic for cross-sectional independence in the residuals (Greene, 2000: 
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 601) indicates that there is a problem of contemporaneous correlation in models 3, 6 
and 9 (Table 6). 
To simultaneously correct the three detected problems we run regressions with 
Feasible Generalizad Least Squares (FGLS) and Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE). According to Beck and Katz (1995) is better to use PCSE models, since the 
standard errors of PCSE fit better than the FGLS ones. Chen et al. (2008) show that 
PCSE estimators are less efficient than FGLS, except when the number of time periods 
in the panel is close to the number of individuals, which is our case (n=17; t=15). Also, 
Chen et al. (2005: 18) offers the following suggestion to researchers dealing with panel 
data: ‘we recommend that researchers use PCSE for hypothesis testing, and Parks 
[FGLS] if their primary interest is accurate coefficient estimates’. Since both questions 
are interesting in the analysis and, given this econometric controversy remains open and 
it is not the aim of this paper, we decide to present the two estimators, both with and 
without political variables. 
Finally, in the IV estimations models the Hausman test clearly suggests that the 
random effects is more accurate because the difference in coefficients is not systematic 
(p-value=0.4757 for the model 20 in Table 8).  
 
5.4. Results 
Table 6 shows the results of the estimations for OLS and GLS models. In almost 
all of them, the coefficient of the variable NPSE is positive and highly significant19. It 
seems to clearly confirm the direct relationship between the number of PSEs and the 
debt they accumulate outside the perimeter of consolidation. A second evidence of the 
‘shift effect' is found in the positive sign of the coefficient for OBJL, although only it is 
                                                          
19 In the model 7 the coefficient of NPSE is significant at 11% level.  
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 significant in OLS estimates. Also, the coefficient of DNEP is significant at the 
standard levels (except in fixed effects estimations 6 and 9). It appears that the stringent 
legal requirements contained in the Spanish budgetary stability law (at least in the 2001 
formulation, i.e. annual equilibrium) have encouraged the levels of debt outside the 
scope of consolidation of the ACs as a means of circumvention. On the contrary, neither 
the OLS nor GLS models are sufficiently conclusive about the 'efficiency effect'. There 
is no a clear effect of PRODCTV variable whose coefficient changes its sign depending 
on the chosen specification and some of them are not significant. However, the worst 
results were obtained with the political variables, as none of them is significant in the 
estimations. Finally, note that the R2 coefficient is quite similar in these nine 
specifications (around 0.30 on average).  
 
Table 6: Results of OLS and GLS estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 OLS GLS-RE GLS-FE OLS GLS-RE GLS-FE OLS GLS-RE GLS-FE 
NPSE 0.7427671 1.720648 2.243823 0.6146058 1.741016 2.19684 0.549565 1.418301 2.074551 
 (2.22)** (3.65)*** (4.44)*** (1.86)* (3.65)*** (4.26)*** (1.63) (2.91)*** (3.79)*** 
OBJ_1 62.26969 9.845981 9.214996 53.285 9.779267 9.149011 53.52526 12.75317 10.49931 
 (3.17)*** (0.66) (0.64) (2.74)*** (0.66) (0.64) (2.71)*** (0.83) (0.72) 
DNEP 43.06311 35.48627 16.17514 57.21511 36.68354 13.66202 60.95672 42.05609 16.1356 
 (3.82)*** (4.20)*** (1.76)* (4.79)*** (3.70)*** (1.28) (4.94)*** (4.13)*** (1.48) 
PRODCTV    -0.009027 -0.0010351 0.0020578 -0.0100196 -0.0024511 0.0016046 
    (-3.10)*** (-0.25) (0.46) (-3.14)*** (-0.59) (0.36) 
DCYC       7.223354 4.320357 5.906811 
       (0.60) (0.52) (0.76) 
DALT       -9.453603 3.817155 (dropped) 
       (-0.81) (0.15)  
DIDEOL       14.15107 18.67787 10.30063 
       (1.15) (1.32) (0.71) 
DALIG       16.87701 10.08562 9.323377 
       (1.50) (1.28) (1.27) 
HIGH 0.0031882 0.0042714 0.0157706 0.0044163 0.0043757 0.0157503 0.004578 0.0042914 0.0159677 
 (3.49)*** (2.34)** (4.63)*** (4.51)*** (2.35)** (4.61)*** (4.47)*** (2.46)** (4.66)*** 
constant -5.682843 -32.97715* -118.4615 202.2077 -9.931585 -165.2552 214.1853 17.12591 -163.4795 
  (-0.60) (-1.68) (-5.11)*** (2.99)*** (-0.10) (-1.60) (2.76)*** (0.17) (-1.55) 
R2 0.3198 0.2861 0.2404 0.3481 0.2904 0.2358 0.3480 0.3139 0.2399 
F-test 24.86 
[0.00] 
--- 33.41 
[0.00] 
22.68 
[0.00] 
--- 26.66 
[0.00] 
13.04 
[0.00] 
 16.93 [0.00] 
Wald χ2(k) --- 109.38 
[0.00] 
--- --- 109.09 
[0.00] 
--- --- --- --- 
Breusch-Pagan χ2(1) --- 301.24 
[0.00] 
--- --- 265.74 
[0.00] 
--- --- 262.82 
[0.00] 
--- 
F-test for all vi=0  --- --- 20.62 
[0.00] 
--- --- 19.07 
[0.00] 
--- --- 18.57 [0.00] 
Hausman χ2(k) --- --- 21.29 
[0.00] 
--- --- 29.35 
[0.00] 
--- --- 168.39 
[0.00] 
Obs. 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Dependent variable: PSED. RE: random effects. FE: fixed effects. Standard errors and z-statistics in parentheses; p-value in 
brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: Own calculations. 
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 The results of FGLS and PCSE models are presented in Table 7. Once we have 
corrected the data problems (autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross-section 
correlation), the signs and significance of the coefficients of DNEP and NPSE are 
consistent with the OLS and GLS models. In addition, the coefficients for NPSE are all 
very close to unity (in the OLS and GLS models ranged between 0.55 and 2.24). 
However, the coefficient on the variable OBJL maintains the expected sign but it is only 
significant in model 12 (FGLS estimation with political variables). The biggest gain of 
the FGLS and PCSE estimations with respect to OLS and GLS ones occurs in 
PRODCTV variable. Now, this coefficient is negative in all cases and it is also 
significant at usual levels. This result would indicate that less productive ACs in non-
market services are accumulating more public debt outside the scope of consolidation, 
probably to redirect some public services outside the regular control of the government. 
As regards the political variables, we can see that all of them have positive coefficients 
but only two of them are significant and they are only in the FGLS estimation. The 
variable DCYC may be indicative of a slight electoral cycle in the ACs which is 
reflected (among other effects) in a higher level of debt in the PSEs. Similarly, the 
ideology of the regional government might contribute to raise the debt outside the scope 
of consolidation. Nonetheless, the implications of the political variables should be taken 
into account with extreme caution. As we remarked before, Chen et al. (2005) 
recommends PCSE models instead of FGLS for hypothesis testing. Unfortunately, in 
this case the coefficients of the political variables are not significant in PCSE 
estimations. 
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 Table 7: Results of FGLS and PCSE estimations 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) 
 FGLS PCSE FGLS PCSE 
NPSE 1.118126 1.084224 0.968701 0.9894096 
 (24.57)*** (2.29)** (11.00)*** (2.16)** 
OBJ_1 0.5230926 4.445255 4.125646 6.403201 
 (0.33) (0.46) (1.85)* (0.61) 
DNEP 29.36016 31.92978 33.78562 34.24597 
 (16.16)*** (3.39)*** (13.39)*** (3.72)*** 
PRODCTV -0.0045627 -0,0050514 -0.0045694 -0.0052213 
 (-9.20)*** (-1.84)* (-6.03)*** (-1.86)* 
DCYC   4.410609 5.945143 
   (3.85)*** (1.05) 
DALT   1.848981 0.4362505 
   (0.25) (0.03) 
DIDEOL   11.93111 11.4378 
   (3.81)*** (1.10) 
DALIG   1.603665 3.870683 
   (1.41) (0.65) 
HIGH 0.0033197 0.0033996 0.0034008 0.0036365 
 (7.37)*** (2.54)** (7.06)*** (2.78)*** 
constant 107.9198 117.3914 100.6917 113.9494 
 (10.05)*** (1.75)* (5.79)*** (1.61) 
R2 --- 0.1676 --- 0.1921 
Wald χ2(k) 2888.85 [0.00] 75.12 [0.00] 781.61 [0.00] 88.41 [0.00] 
Obs. 204 204 204 204 
Dependent variable: PSED. z-statistics in parentheses; p-value in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table 8 displays the results of IV-2SLS regression while the output of the first-
stage estimations are presented in the Appendix (Table A2). All the political variables 
have been removed because their individual and global lack of significance. The 
instrumented variable is the number of PSEs (NPSE) which is instrumented by the one-
period lag of the public debt (DEBTL) and the public real investment (INVL). We have 
estimated 9 different models, i.e. the same specification with three different estimators 
(pooled, random effects and fixed effects) and three samples (full sample, subsample of 
‘fast lane’ ACs and subsample of ‘slow lane’ ACs). 
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 Table 8: Results of IV estimations 
 (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
 IV-pooled IV-pooled IV-pooled IV-RE IV-RE IV-RE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE 
 All ACs ‘Fast lane’ ACs ‘Slow lane’ ACs All ACs ‘Fast lane’ ACs ‘Slow lane’ ACs All ACs ‘Fast lane’ ACs ‘Slow lane’ ACs 
NPSE 2.767158 1.639365 -0.9197611 2.271217 4.831056 -0.3654903 1.260846 4.14295 0.8840216 
 (5.78)*** (3.48)*** (-0.86) (2.10)** (3.28)*** (-0.16) (0.89) (3.03)*** (0.33) 
DNEP 34.81483 51.17004 39.39698 26.18469 18.88649 18.67082 28.95442 21.08376 15.41689 
 (2.17)** (2.36)** (1.67)* (2.19)** (1.00) (1.01) (2.06)** (1.13) (0.85) 
PRODCTV -0.0093016 -0.0263693 -0.039471 -0.0012213 -0.0302377 0.0110261 0.0017895 -0.0281949 0.0194578 
 (-2.83)*** (-5.20)*** (-1.00) (-0.27) (-3.47)*** (2.11)** (0.34) (-3.09)*** (3.29)*** 
GDPPC 0.0032233 0.0183009 0.0448722 0.003978 0.016739 0.001051 0.0053895 0.0182399 -0.0076559 
 (1.60) (5.56)*** (3.38)*** (1.11) (3.47)*** (0.20) (1.24) (3.79)*** (-0.99) 
constant 137.1989 357.422 54.98502 -50.01557 334.5754 -237.3863 -114.7253 292.3649 -319.9704 
 (1.84)* (3.78)*** (0.60) (-0.49) (1.88)* (-2.08)** (-1.03) (1.59) (-2.64)*** 
R2 0.2054 0.4883 0.1076 0.2760 0.3118 0.0260 0.2796 0.3449 0.0008 
F-test 24.79 [0.00] 22.44 [0.00] 12.07 [0.00] --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Wald χ2(k) --- --- --- 87.98 [0.00] 117.34 [0.00] 23.98 [0.00] 421.09 [0.00] 592.70 [0.00] 120.08 [0.00] 
Hausman χ2(k) --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.50 [0.48] 0.40 [0.98] 4.19 [0.38] 
Obs. 204 84 120 204 84 120 204 84 120 
Dependent variable: PSED. RE: random effects. FE: fixed effects. Standard errors and z-statistics in parentheses; p-value in 
brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: Own calculations. 
 
The results for the full sample with variable DNEP are robust and consistent 
with OLS, GLS, FGLS and PCSE estimations. The sign of the coefficient for this 
variable is always positive, although it is not significant in models based on panel data 
estimation with subsamples (models 18, 19, 21 and 22). 
The coefficient for NPSE is positive and statistically significant in all the models 
based either on the whole sample and in the subsample for ‘fast lane’ ACs (with  the 
unique exception of model 20 where it is positive but it is not significant). It is also very 
relevant that the number of PSEs depends crucially on the volume of general debt in the 
past (see first-stage results in Appendix for more details). Taking the two results 
together, we can explain the debt of PSEs on the basis of a direct effect (the growing 
number of PSEs) which is also indirectly determined by the growing volume of general 
debt (inside the scope of consolidation). To be short, there could be a simultaneous 
rising of the two types of debt, although much general debt is being ‘shifted’ to PSEs.   
When we split the sample, the variable NPSE changes the sign of its influence 
for the subsample of ‘slow lane’ ACs but the coefficient is no longer significant. This 
reveals that the effect of a higher number of PSEs on the debt outside the scope of 
consolidation differs clearly between the two groups of ACs. Maybe, the broad 
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 experience in ‘fast lane’ ACs with their institutional Public Sector induces them to 
make an intensive use of PSEs in order to circumvent the legal requirements.   
The results for the PRODCTV variable are more erratic both for the whole 
sample (models 14, 17 and 20) and the ‘slow lane’ ACs subsample (models 16, 19 and 
22). Conversely, the coefficients of PRODCTV are always negative and statistically 
significant in models based on the ‘fast lane’ regions (models 15, 18 and 21). In fact, 
the results for the latter ACs are the unique that are fully coherent in signs with FGLS 
and PCSE estimations. In the case of ACs with higher expenditure powers before 2002, 
the lower the apparent productivity of labour in non-market services, the higher the debt 
of PSEs. This could be due to the pejorative argument of experience in public 
management which has been also used in the comments for the NPSE variable. 
Finally the control variable (GDPPC) has a positive influence on the debt 
outside the perimeter of consolidation, with the exception of model 22 (non significant). 
Yet again, the best results are obtained for the subsample of ‘fast lane’ ACs (models 15, 
18 and 21). In general, it seems that higher-income ACs are also the ones that more 
intensively shift debt from the general government to PSEs.  
It appears to be clear that the variety of institutional structures in Spain is a 
crucial issue when studying the determinants of PSEs debt. In particular, there exists 
very distinct profiles for ‘fast lane’ ACs and ‘slow lane’ ACs. Our results are quite solid 
and consistent with the previous research, in particular with the approximations made 
by Fernández-Llera (2005) and Cuadrado-Roura and Carrillo-Neff (2008).  
 
6. Conclusions 
The stringent limitations to deficit and debt as well as the facility to avoid some 
legal requirements for the public management have excited the growing number of 
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 PSEs in subnational governments. This should not be a worrying issue unless the 
subcentral governments were using the PSEs only as a way to elude the legal 
limitations. The case of ACs in Spain appears to be a good example in that sense, 
especially since the entry into force of the budgetary stability law in 2002.  
The descriptive analysis has shown significant growth in PSEs of the ACs 
because of that ‘shift effect’. This mechanism could be considered as a way to hide 
debt, with the ultimate goal of maintaining the investment effort, while circumventing 
the budgetary stability law. 
The paper proposes an empirical model in order to analyse that concern. The 
endogenous variable in the econometric model is the ACs’ public enterprises debt, that 
is, the debt which is out of the consolidation scope. To obtain it, we use the official 
statistics published by the Spanish Central Bank. The key independent variable is the 
number of PSEs in the ACs, and also the deviation from the deficit objective in the past. 
We also introduce a representative index of productivity to approximate the efficiency 
in regional public sector. Finally, in a dynamic context, a negative and significant link 
between general public debt and PSEs debt would confirm the ‘shift effect’ previously 
mentioned. In this case, the general public debt would have been used as an instrument 
for the number of PSEs in order to control for possible endogeneity.  
The general results show a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the number of PSEs and the debt outside the consolidation perimeter. This is a 
solid result, robust to alternative specifications of the model and consistent with 
previous empirical research. In the same way, which lead to conclude that there exists 
an accumulative debt process, in a bureaucratic and Leviathan state context. 
Additionally, we confirm our expectations in relation to the deviations from the deficit 
objectives, finding a positive and significant link between both variables. Thus, higher 
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 deviations lead to high levels of public enterprises debt, although the statistical evidence 
is weaker than in case of the variable NPSE. Finally, we capture a inverse relationship 
between aggregate productivity and PSEs’ debt even though this fact could be due to 
the indirect effect of productivity on the number of PSEs.  
The results show that there are very significant differences between the two 
groups of ACs, as they had assumed great powers of health and education before 2002 
or not. Anyway, it is expected that this structural difference is becoming blurred along 
next years, since the CCAA are de facto managing the same program expenditures since 
that date. In any case, it will be suitable in the future the evaluation of the actual impact 
of the deficit target over the economic cycle, valid in Spain from 2006 onwards.
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 Appendix 
 
Table A1: Description of variables (basic model) 
 Brief description Units Range  Source 
Dependent variable     
PSED Debt of PSEs (outside the scope of consolidation) € / Inhabitant 1994-2008 BDE / INE 
Independent variables     
Central hypotheses      
NPSE Number of PSEs Number 1994-2006 IGAE / INE 
OBJ Deviation of the deficit target (=0 if the actual deficit is less than or equal to the target) 
% Regional GDP 1995-2008 IGAE / INE / Own elaboration 
DNEP Dummy for years with stability budgetary law (=1 if year≥2002;  =0 otherwise) 
Dummy  1994-2008 Own elaboration 
PRODCTV Apparent labour productivity in non-market services € / Employee 1994-2008 INE 
Political variables     
DCYC  Dummy for electoral cycle (=1 if there is regional elections in the year; =0 otherwise) 
Dummy  1994-2008 Own elaboration / MIR 
DALT 
Dummy for political alternation in regional government (1=if there 
was al least one change of party in the regional government during 
the 1994-2008 period; =0 otherwise) 
Dummy  
1994-2008 Own elaboration / MIR 
DIDEOL Dummy for ideology of regional government (1=left-wing; 0=otherwise, including rightists, regionalists and nationalists) 
Dummy  1994-2008 Own elaboration / MIR 
DALIG 
Dummy for partisan alignment between central and regional 
governments (=1 if the regional government is politically or 
ideologically aligned with the central one; =0 otherwise) 
Dummy  
1994-2008 Own elaboration / MIR 
Instrumental variables      
DEBTL Public debt (inside the scope of consolidation) € / Inhabitant 1994-2008 BDE / INE 
INVL Real investment executed by regional government    1994-2008 BADESPE / MEH 
Control variables     
GDPPC GDP per capita € / Inhabitant 1994-2008 BADESPE / INE 
HIGH 
=0 for ‘slow lane’ ACs 
=GDPPC for ‘fast lane’ ACs (regions with responsibility over 
common public services as well as the major services of health and 
education) 
€ / Inhabitant 1994-2008 Own elaboration / BADESPE / INE 
BDE: Bank of Spain. INE: Spanish National Statistics Institute. IGAE: General Comptroller of the State Administration. BADESPE: 
Economic Database of the Spanish Public Sector. MEH: Ministry of Economy and Finance. MIR: Ministry of Interior. All monetary 
variables are in constant 2001 euros.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Table A2: First-stage estimations in IV models 
 (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
 IV-pooled IV-pooled IV-pooled IV-RE IV-RE IV-RE IV-FE IV-FE IV-FE 
 All ACs ‘Fast lane’ 
ACs 
‘Slow lane’ 
ACs 
All ACs ‘Fast lane’ 
ACs 
‘Slow lane’ 
ACs 
All ACs ‘Fast lane’ 
ACs 
‘Slow lane’ 
ACs 
DEBTL 0.033991 0.0145469 0.0317746 0.0160073 0.0151777 0.0159728 0.0137272 0.0160633 0.012187 
 (10.76) (2.62) (8.60)*** (6.39)*** (4.06) (4.11) (5.74) (4.28)*** (3.06)*** 
INVL -0.0891475 -0.1900412 0.0273691 -0.0188231 0.0123406 0.0031941 -0.0101353 0.0462048 -0.0069095 
 (-6.96) (-9.73) (3.63)*** (-2.07)** (0.45) (0.38) (-1.19) (1.66) (-0.74) 
DNEP 7.615744 5.112768 2.921237 5.23361 8.189461 3.762259 5.385717 8.127369 3.375611 
 (2.94) (1.40) (1.68)* (3.38)*** (3.04) (2.31) (3.63) (3.02)*** (2.06)** 
PRODCTV 0.0039915 0.0033699 -0.0014242 0.0007909 0.0011116 -0.0002549 0.0002029 0.0005208 -0.0001461 
 (6.60) (3.01) (-3.23)*** (1.24) (0.81) (-0.45) (0.31) (0.36) (-0.23) 
PIBCH -0.0001749 0.0014052 0.0002157 0.0015169 0.0013157 0.0011657 0.0016698 0.0015943 0.0018906 
 (-0.45) (1.86) (0.91) (3.62)*** (1.60) (2.90) (3.78) (1.89)* (3.29)*** 
constant -74.23188 -36.31553 21.19374 -23.474 -22.28128 -6.431526 -11.82307 -20.0517 -15.62832 
 (-5.66) (-1.59) (2.06)** (-1.70)* (-0.79) (-0.50) (-0.87) (-0.69) (-1.18) 
R2 0.5635 0.6240 0.6569 --- --- --- 0.3791 0.0493 0.4458 
F-test  51.13 [0.00] 28.55 [0.00] 46.57 [0.00] --- --- --- 43.78 [0.00] 19.90 [0.00] 30.50 [0.00] 
Wald χ2(k) --- --- --- 204.00 [0.00] 88.00 [0.00] 156.00 [0.00] --- --- --- 
Wald test 
for DEBTL 
and INVL 
(χ2) 
54.86 [0.00] 96.63 [0.00] 35.46 [0.00] --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Obs. 204 84 120 204 84 120 204 84 120 
Instrumented variable: NPSE. RE: random effects. FE: fixed effects. Standard errors and z-statistics in parentheses; p-value in 
brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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